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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 














Case No • 
18357 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT Of THE NAl'IJRE QF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, § 76-6-202, Burglary, a third degree 
felony. Appellant appeals from a conviction of that offense 
in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County. 
PISPQSITION IN XH~ LOWER COURT 
Appellant Miera was charged with violation of UCA, 
1953, § 76-6-202 (1953), Burglary, a third degree felony. A 
jury trial was held in Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, on March 8, 1982 before the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
where appellant was convicted as charged. 
M~IEF SOUGHT ON APPEA~ 
Respondent, State of Utah, seeks an Order 
affirming the conviction and judgment of the trial court. 
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STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
On December 31, 1981, shortly before 2:00 a.m., 
Officer vantielen of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
observed a broken window at an off ice building in Salt Lake 
City. Shortly thereafter the appellant was observed inside 
the building (R.99). 
Officer vantielen gained entrance to the building 
and approached the defendant who was against the front door 
of the business with his hands in the air (R.105). 
The officer requested appellant to get down on his 
stomach and appellant complied without hesitation (R.107). 
Officer Vantielen testified that the defendant answered 
questions with coherent speech, was responsive to questions 
and appeared to be sober as the officer watched him walk. 
The officer further testified that he did not smell the odor 
of an alcoholic beverage about the defendant (R.114). 
Upon searching the premises it was determined that 
the defendant was alone CR.113) inside the building and that 
he had a roll of stamps and a pen and pencil set in his 
pockets (R.109). These items were subsequently identified 
by the owner of the building as having been taken from his 
office CR.136-137). 
Officer Vantielen also testified that after an 
appropriate Miranda warning that the appellant said he had 
taken the writing instruments and stamps out of a desk in 
-2-
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one of the offices in the building CR.107-108,111). 
Officer Green testified that he assisted Officer 
Vantielen in the apprehension of the appellant CR.121-126), 
and that he observed the appellant walk in a normal manner 
CR.125). This officer also indicated that the appellant was 
alert and responsive to questions (T.125). 
Mr. Richard Gordon, the owner of the building 
CR.129), took the stand and testified that the stamps and 
pens which had been found on the appellant's person were 
taken from his (Gordon's) office CR.135-136). 
Additionally, Mr. Gordon testified that items in 
his off ice had been moved, including a radio which had been 
unplugged and had the cord wrapped around it (R.137). Mr. 
Gordon also testified that he heard the officers ask the 
appellant why he was in the building to which the appellant 
answered, in substance, that he broke in because he needed 
some money CR.142-143). 
Mr. Gordon further testified that the appellant 
did not appear to be intoxicated CR.143) and responded to 
questions understandably and intelligently and did not 
appear to have difficulty standing (R.141). 
The appellant elected to take the stand and 
testified about his toluene and alcohol usage CR.151-152). 
Appellant admitted entering the building and admitted 
throwing rocks through the window of the building and 
-3-
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indicated that he remembered doing both acts CR.157-160). 
Appellant's second witness was Dr. Bryan Finkle 
who testified extensively and hypothetically about alcohol 
and its physiological effects CR.168-193), but without any 
personal knowledge of the appellant or the amount of alcohol 
consumed by him CR.174-175). 
Dr. Finkle testified that his expertise was .D.Q.t. 
in the area of the effects of alcohol on mentel functions 
and that appellant's alleged level of intoxication would not 
necessarily create unconsciousness or a blackout CR.188-
189,191). 
Dr. Finkle also indicated that determining a 
person's state of mind after consuming alcohol and sniffing 
solvent was "far beyond" his "professional capacity" and 
that alcohol can impair but not necessarily destroy mental 
processes CR.191). 
Following the testimony, appellant submitted three 
instructions relating to the lesser-included offense of 
criminal trespass CR.41-43). The request for these 
instructions was denied, and the court instructed the jury 
as to the elements of burglary and on the issue of voluntary 
intoxication (R.44-70). 
Following trial defendant was convicted as charged 
of burglary, a third degree felony. 
-4-
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ARGUMENl' 
fQINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO 
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS. 
Appellant was charged with burglary and the jury 
instructed on the elements of that offense. Appellant 
contends that he was entitled to jury instructions on the 
lesser included offense of criminal trespass. 
This Court recently discussed in some detail the 
issue of lesser included offenses and specifically discussed 
the question of jury instructions relating to the offenses 
of burglary and criminal trespass. 
In state v. Bsk~4, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1983), 
this Court held that, "The defendant's right to a lesser 
included offense instruction is limited by the evidence 
presented at trial." .I..d. at 157. Further amplication of 
this standard was established by the Court in setting forth 
the provisions of UCA, 1953, § 76-1-402(4): 
The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense • 
.I.Q.. at 158. 
This Court further indicated that, "The analysis 
of whether an offense is included for purposes of deciding 
whether to grant a defendant's request for a jury 
-5-
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instruction must • • • begin with the proof of facts at 
trial." .I.Q.. at 158. 
Also, this Court clarified the application of this 
standard by holding: 
Under§ 76-1-402(4), the court is 
obligated to instruct on the lesser 
offense only if the evidence offered 
provides a "rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the 
included offense." 
.l.Q.. at 159. 
This Court also held in relation to a request for 
a criminal trespass instruction that it is an offense which 
requires specific intent. .l.Q.. at 160. 
Applying these standards, this Court held in 
eaker, supra, that the evidence was not ambiguous or 
subject to any alternative interpretation and the requested 
criminal trespass instruction was not required. 
The facts of ~skex, supra and the case now 
before the Court are remarkably similar. In that case the 
defendant was found inside a locked building and he did not 
deny unlawful entry. .I.Q.. at 160. 
In the present case, the appellant admitted on 
direct examination throwing rocks through the building 
window and entering the building (R.157). As in Saker, 
supra, the appellant does not deny unlawful entry into the 
building. This leaves as the only disputed factual issue 
-6-
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the intent of the appellant. 
In order to receive an included offense 
instruction, it must be shown that, first there is a 
rational basis for acquittal of the charged offense .s.nQ. 
conviction of the included offense. 
Assuming arguendo that criminal trespass is an 
included offense of burglary, the facts presented at trial 
do not justify the giving of the "lesser included" 
instructions. 
Appellant argues that his conviction for criminal 
trespass is supported by evidence of his recklessness. 
Specifically, appellant asserts in his brief that " ••• he 
acted with an awareness but disregard of the risks to any 
potential persons inside the building." (Appellant's Brief, 
page 8.) Appellant's testimony in this respect is extremely 
equivocal. At pages 156 and 157 of the record the following 
exchange took place between appellant and his counsel: 
Q Now, Fermin, did you have occasion to 
pass a building at 254 west and First 
south? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know what that building is? 
What was in there? 
A Now I do. I didn't then. 
Q You didn't then. Did you ever [sic] 
that building? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember entering it? 
A Vaguel~, But I--yeah. I entered 
.J.t.. 
Q Do you remember throwing rocks 
through the window? 
A Yeah. 
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Q Were you aware that you were in the 
building? 
A No--yeah--yeah. 
Q Do you want to explain that? To what 
extent were you aware? 
A Well, the cop came and busted me in 
there. He had a--looked like a .38 in 
my head now. 
Q ~o, you were awat~ bec9yse the 
o.tf icer;s CQJU~? 
A I heard Jake Green yell. Yes. 
Q Why did you enter the building, 
Fermin? 
A I don't know. 
Q Why don't you know? 
A aec~yse I w9sn't AW~re what was 
ba12penin9. 
Q Why do you think you weren't aware? 
A Because I was pretty loaded. I mean, 
I was high. (Emphasis added.) 
This testimony not only negates any specific intent but also 
negates the "awareness" required for recklessness. 
follows: 
UCA, 1953, § 76-2-103, defines recklessly as 
A person engages in conduct: ••• 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with 
respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he is 9wate of but consciously 
gisreg9rgs a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard 
constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. (Emphasis added.) 
In order to be "reckless" under the criminal 
trespass statute, UCA, 1953 § 76-6-206, one must be shown to 
be "reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the safety of another." Appellant testified he was not 
aware of what was happening (R.157). 
The appellant cites no evidence which shows that 
he was reckless as to his presence in the business causing 
fear for the safety of another. No evidence was submitted 
by the appellant which would show that he was even aware 
that anyone was in the building. Indeed, the testimony was 
that no one else~ in the building (R.113). 
The record shows that the entry into the building 
probably occurred in the early hours of the morning at 
approximately 2:00 a.m. CR.98) when the presence of other 
persons was most unlikely. 
Applying the facts of this case to the standard 
enunciated in Baker, supra, it is evident that those facts 
do not justify the giving of a criminal trespass 
instruction, for the reason that no evidence was presented 
by the appellant which would justify a finding of either 
specific intent or recklessness. 
Since there is no denial of the unlawful entry, 
the only remaining factual dispute is the appellant's 
intent, which must be inf erred from circumstantial evidence. 
St9te ~, Baker, supra at 160. Here the appellant claims 
that his intoxication prevented him from forming the 
requisite intent for a burglary conviction, but the evidence 
relating to that claim is that the officers found the 
-9-
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appellant not sufficiently enough impaired to prevent his 
being able to hear, understand, communicate and walk without 
significant impairment CR.114 and 125). Also, Dr. Finkle 
could not testify as to any aspect of intent and indeed 
indicated that intoxication would not necessarily impair 
intent. ( R.191) • 
Just as in eak~r, supra, the thrust of the 
appellant's testimony and evidence of intoxication was to 
negate any specific intent, not towards proving one of the 
requisite intents required for criminal trespass, set forth 
in UCA, 1953, § 76-6-206(1) and (2). 
The issue of jury instructions as it relates to 
burglary and criminal trespass was also addressed in State 
Y. eengrick~, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah, 1979), where this Court 
held that the "defendants defense of lack of criminal intent 
is totally inconsistent with his request for an instruction 
on criminal trespass." ig_. at 634. 
While acknowledging defendant's right to have his 
theory of the case presented to the jury, this Court in 
Hgndrick§, supra, also held: 
However, the right is not absolute, and 
a defense theory must be supported by a 
certain quantum of evidence before an 
instruction as to an included offense 
need be given • 
.I.Q.. at 634. 
The evidence presented at trial does not justify 
-10-
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the giving of a criminal trespass instruction because that 
evidence does not provide a rational basis for a verdict of 
acquittal of burglary nor does that eviaence provide a 
rational foundation upon which a verdict of guilty could be 
returned for the offense of criminal trespass.-
fQINt II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE ISSUE OF VOLUNTARY 
INTOXICATION. 
Appellant claims that the trial court refused to 
include the negation of the affirmative defense of 
intoxication as an element which the State was required to 
prove. In fact, however, the trial court did clearly set 
out the burden of the State with respect to the affirmative 
defense of voluntary intoxication. 
Appellant has asserted that the jury could have 
been confused in connection with the Court's giving of 
Instruction No. 12 and Instruction No. 13 on the issue of 
voluntary intoxication and the State's burden in connection 
with this defense. Appellant's apparently inadvertant 
reference to Instructions 12 and 13 is confusing since those 
instructions CR.53 and 54) relate to witnesses, resolving 
conflicting evidence, circumstantial and direct evidence. 
Those instructions bear no relationship to the defense of 
voluntary intoxication. 
The trial court specifically instructed the jury 
-11-
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regarding this defense in Instruction No. 23 CR. 64). This 
Instruction provides: 
In this case the defendant has raised 
the defense of voluntary intoxication. 
Once this defense is raised the State 
has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the degree of 
intoxication at the time in question did 
not destroy his ability to form the 
necessary intent required for the crime 
in question. 
It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of 
the State's burden as to the defense of voluntary 
intoxication. No ambiguity or confusion is reasonably 
possible on this issue. This is unlike the situation in 
State ~. to,res, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah, 1980) where the trial 
court failed to give an appropriate instruction concerning 
the burden of proof when an affirmative defense is raised. 
In UDiteg States y, ~Ot{ig90, 548 F.2d 879 (10th 
Cir. 1977) the Court held, in relation to instructing the 
jury on affirmative defenses that: 
The question is whether the 
instructions, taken as a whole, 
adequately informed the jury that the 
prosecution's burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt applied to defendant's 
affirmative defense • 
.I.Q.. at 882. 
The Court also held: 
We are ItQ,t. saying the burden of proof 
should be rgiterated in each seBarate 
instruction • 
.I.Q.. at 883 (emphasis added). 
-12-
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Following the Instruction listed above, the Court 
then gave Instruction No. 24 CR. 65) , which instructs 
further on the defense of voluntary intoxication. This 
instruction sets forth the nature of this defense and is 
couched in the precise terms of the voluntary intoxication 
statute, UCA, 1953, § 76-2-306. 
Further, the trial court immediately followed up 
with Instruction No. 25 CR. 66) which established the 
elements of the crime of burglary, including the requisite 
intent. The required burden of proof was set forth and 
acquittal was directed if all elements were not proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Court's Instruction Nos. 23, 24 and 25 CR. 64, 
65 and 66) do not require the jury to engage in the 
"tortious process" condemned in Iarres, supra, to 
establish and define the burden on the State, but rather 
clearly set forth the elements of the offense and obligation 
of the State. 
This Court in ~orrep, supra, indicated the 
purpose of jury instructions. This Court held: 
The purpose of the instructions is to 
set forth the issues and the law 
applicable thereto in a clear, concise 
and orderly manner, so that the jury 
will understand how to discharge its 
responsibilities • 
.l.d.... at 696. 
This purpose was fully and adequately discharged 
-13-
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by the Court's instructions in all respects and particularly 
with regard to appellant's voluntary intoxication defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly refused to give the 
appellant's lesser included criminal trespass instruction in 
that the evidence presented did not justify such an 
instruction. Further, the Court fully and accurately 
instructed the jury on the issue of voluntary intoxication. 
Respectfully submitted this .)Ot~ day of 
April, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Chief, Governmental Affairs 
Division 
STANLEY H 
Assista Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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